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ABSTRACT
As the baby boom cohort reaches retirement age, demographic pressures on public programs such
as social security may cause policy makers to cut benefits and encourage employment at later ages.
This paper reports on a labor market experiment to determine the hiring conditions for older women
in entry-level jobs in Boston, MA and St. Petersburg, FL. Differential interviewing by age is found
for these jobs. A younger worker is more than 40% more likely to be offered an interview than an
older worker. No evidence is found to support taste-based discrimination as a reason for this
differential and some suggestive evidence is found to support statistical discrimination.
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1  Introduction 
In a 2004 speech to the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan suggested that 
encouraging older people to work could solve many of the problems that will occur as the 
large baby boom cohort reaches retirement age.
1  If older workers remained in the labor 
force, social security benefits could be cut without compromising living standards.  From 
a productivity standpoint, workers should be capable of working longer than they had in 
the past.  Not only are people living longer, but several studies suggest that today' s 70 
year olds are comparable in health and mental function to 65 year olds from 30 years ago 
(Schaie 1996, Baltes et al 1988).  Many older Americans also need to work, even if social 
security benefits are not cut.  Bernheim (1997) estimates that baby boomers on average 
are only saving a third of what they need to maintain a pre-retirement standard of living 
after retirement.  This lack of adequate retirement savings is especially acute for older 
widows, who, on average, suffer a 30 percent drop in living standards upon the death of a 
husband (Holden and Zick 1998).  In fact, the poverty rate for older widows is 15% 
(Favreault et al. 2002).  Finally, Abraham and Houseman (2004) find that although most 
older workers plan to continue working at least part time instead of fully retiring, those 
who  would  have  to  change  jobs  in  order  to  reduce  hours  are  likely  to  stop  working 
entirely, suggesting that there is something preventing them from finding a new job. 
Will older American women be able to find work?  Economists generally assume 
that staying out of the labor force is a choice for women, so only supply-side factors 
come into play in policy discussions, such as those regarding social security.  This study 
explores the demand-side of policies that rely on older women finding jobs at the normal 
                                                 
1 Alan Greenspan was not the first to suggest encouraging older workers to remain in the labor force as a 
partial solution to the Social Security problem, see, for example, Diamond and Orszag (2002). 3 
age of retirement by running a labor market experiment to explore the hiring behavior of 
firms  seeking  entry-level  or  close  to  entry-level  employees.    Although  a  number  of 
sociology  and  psychology  studies  have  directly  examined  age  discrimination,  these 
studies typically present a human resources manager (or worse, a group of undergraduate 
psychology students) with two resumes, one of an older worker and one of a younger 
worker, and ask which the manager would be more likely to hire (e.g. Nelson 2002).  In 
contrast,  this  experiment  analyzes  real  rather  than  hypothetical  hiring  choices  by 
businesses that do not know they are being studied.   
My study examines the entry-level or close to entry-level labor market options for 
women ages 35 to 62 in Boston, MA and St. Petersburg, FL.  I send pairs of resumes to 
employers in these two cities and measure the response rates by age, as indicated on each 
resume by date of high school graduation.  In addition, I explore reasons for differential 
responses by age to resumes in several ways.  First, I explore statistical discrimination, 
which is defined as an employer judging a job applicant based on her age-group status 
rather than on her own individual characteristics.  To study this type of discrimination, I 
look at the effect of resume elements that could signal that the older worker does not fit a 
stereotype/group characteristic of older workers.  Second, I look at employer taste-based 
discrimination by examining the effect of a firm having a human resources department, 
since  these  departments  would  be  likely  to  have  had  training  in  discrimination  law.  
Third, I examine employee taste-based discrimination by looking at the age break-down 
of  workers  in  each  firm’s  geographic  area.    Finally,  I  examine  consumer  taste-based 
discrimination by looking at the residential demographics of each firm’s geographic area. 
I  find  evidence  of  differential  hiring  by  age  in  these  two  labor  markets.    A 4 
younger worker is 42% more likely than an older worker to be offered an interview in 
Massachusetts and 46% more likely to be offered an interview in Florida.  Statistical 
discrimination is the most likely explanation for this differential hiring behavior.  This 
study finds little to no evidence for taste-based discriminatory behavior, whether from 
employers, co-workers or consumers, although the tests used are not perfect. 
Age  discrimination  is  comparatively  understudied  by  economists.
2    Although 
displaced older workers take longer to find employment than do younger
3, it is not known 
whether this delay is due to discrimination, higher reservation wages, or clustering in 
dying industries.  Experimental labor market studies such as this one have the advantage 
of directly observing discrimination as it happens.  Such studies have primarily examined 
discrimination on the basis of gender and race (e.g. Fix and Struyk 1993, Yinger 1998, 
Neumark et al. 1996).  Only one set of these studies (a resume study combined with a 
matched pairs audit) has explored age discrimination (Bendick et al. 1996, Bendick 1999) 
and there is concern that this study lacks comparable controls (Riach and Rich 2002).   
This  paper  is  structured  as  follows:    Section  II  gives  some  background 
information  on  discrimination  laws,  testing  for  discrimination  and  types  of 
discrimination.  Section III gives an overview of the experimental design.  Section IV 
describes the empirical framework for both differential hiring by age and reasons for 
differential  hiring  by  age.    Section  V  provides  results  and  Section  VI  discusses 
                                                 
2 When discussing the term “discrimination,” I use a value-free definition of the word, such as in Lundberg 
and Startz (1983) that includes forms of differential behavior such as statistical discrimination, where it is 
possible for the same average productivity to receive the same average compensation.  It does not imply 
that there is necessarily any animus-based discrimination, simply differential behavior. 
3 The 2000 CPS Displaced Worker Survey finds that the average 12 weeks search time for workers age 55 
to 74 was 3.6 weeks longer than that for workers age 19 to 39.  Additionally, 39% of displaced older 
workers in the February 2000 CPS had not found reemployment by the time of the survey, whereas only 
19% of those between 40 and 54 had not found reemployment (US General Accounting Office 2001). 5 
implications.    Section  VII  concludes.    Further  information  on  the  specifics  of  the 
experimental design can be found in the data appendix at the end of the paper.  
 
2  Background 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, implemented in 1968 and enforced 
in 1978, covers workers age 40 and up in firms with 20 or more employees, with a few 
exceptions.
4    This  law  prohibits  discrimination  against  older  workers  through  hiring, 
firing,  and  failure  to  promote  mechanisms.    Since  it  is  more  difficult  for  workers  to 
determine why they failed to receive an interview than it is for workers to determine why 
they have been fired, firms that wish to retain only a certain type of worker without being 
sued would prefer to discriminate in the hiring stage rather than at any other point of the 
employment process.    
Labor market studies such as this one that test for discrimination in hiring by 
sending resumes are called “resume audits” in the United States and “correspondence 
tests”  in  the  United  Kingdom.    These  studies  directly  test  for  discrimination  with  a 
minimum of omitted variables bias.  Other audit studies send two trained “auditors,” 
matched in all respects except the variable of interest, usually race, to rent an apartment, 
buy a house or interview for a job.  In practice, however, it is difficult to match people 
exactly
5; one cannot rule out systematic differences observable to the employer between 
the two groups being studied.  Experiments such as this one, using randomized resumes, 
potentially bypass the matching problem.  This type of experiment also has the benefit of 
being  able  to  explore  the  different  reasons  that  employers  might  discriminate  against 
                                                 
4 Firms are exempt if they can prove a bona-fide occupational requirement (BFOQ) that is directly related 
to age (for example, an acting position), or if the position is a high salaried policy making position. 
5 Other problems with this method are elucidated by Heckman and Siegelman(1993) and Heckman (1998). 6 
older workers. 
  Economic  theory  generally  distinguishes  between  two  major  types  of 
discrimination:  statistical  discrimination  and  taste-based  discrimination.   Statistical 
discrimination occurs when an individual is judged based on group characteristics.  This 
form  of  discrimination  is  generally  thought  to  be  efficient  for  employers  in  cases  of 
imperfect information
6 (Arrow 1972).  For example, if, in general, it is true that older 
workers take longer to learn unfamiliar tasks, then an employer may be reluctant to hire 
an older worker, because testing each older applicant for ability to learn is costly.  Taste-
based discrimination occurs when an employer, a set of employees, or a customer base, 
gets  disutility  from  working  with  individuals  from  a  specific  group.   This  form  of 
discrimination  is  generally  thought  to  be  inefficient  from  an  overall  welfare  point  of 
view, although it provides utility to the discriminator (Becker 1971). 
 
3  Experimental Design 
  I sent resumes to 3996 firms in the greater Boston, Massachusetts and greater St. 
Petersburg, Florida areas.  Boston was chosen for convenience and St. Petersburg was 
chosen because it both has a similar demographic mix to what the US Census projects the 
entire United States to have in the 2020s, that is, it has a large concentration of elderly, 
and because the St. Petersburg/Tampa Bay MSA is approximately equal in magnitude to 
the Boston PMSA.
7   Each Sunday, 40 want-ads were culled from the Sunday Boston 
                                                 
6 Though, of course, it is not in the best interest of high achieving individuals in the discriminated against 
group and may have negative welfare implications overall. 
7 The Boston PMSA had a population of 3,285,387 in 1998, Tampa/St. Petersburg had a population of 
2,254,405 in 1998. 7 
Globe and 40 from the online version of the Sunday St. Petersburg Times.
8  Monday 
through Wednesday of each week, company names and numbers were randomly selected 
from the Verizon superpages for Boston and for St. Petersburg and 10 firms were chosen 
in each city as “call-ins.”  A computer program mixed and matched work histories and 
other resume parts from actual entry-level applicants to randomly create new resumes for 
specified positions.  Genuine resumes for many different job categories were taken off of 
online  sites  such  as  www.americasjobbank.com.    These  resumes  were  sorted  by 
occupation and age and had items such as previous work experience, licensure, awards, 
hobbies  and  volunteer  work  collected  together  and  entered  into  a  computer  program.  
Summary statistics for the resumes can be found in the Appendix Tables 1a and 1b .  
Employers  could  reply  to  the  job  seekers  via  a  voicemail  box  obtained  from 
www.mynycoffice.com  and  an  email  address  from  www.hotmail.com.    Detailed 
information on the process of resume creation and distribution can be found in the Data 
Appendix. 
For  the  most  part,  the  resumes  created  for  the  audit  used  items  from  actual 
resumes (but not in any way that could be connected to the original resume).  Two items 
included in some of the sent resumes did not appear in actual resumes:  the specific 
places of high school graduation and a declaration of health insurance status.    Two 
schools from small college towns from the Midwest were chosen so that employers could 
not use perceived high school quality (from 17 to 44 years ago) as a signal for worker 
quality.  Some resumes in the experiment included a statement that the applicant did not 
need health insurance benefits.  First names chosen for the job candidates were the first 
                                                 
8 The St. Petersburg Times puts all of its want-ads online, whereas the Boston Globe charges employers 
extra to be included in the online listings. 8 
and second most popular female names in the United States for the year of birth of that 
candidate (Mary and Linda), and the last names chosen were the first and second most 
popular  last  names  in  the  US  (Smith  and  Jones),  according  to  social  security 
administration  data.
9    The  addresses  chosen  were  from  middle  class  neighborhoods 
which, according to the census, had a wide variation in income and other demographic 
characteristics (for example, Somerville, MA).   
Unlike race or gender, age is a continuous variable.  Because I use multiple ages 
in  my  study  instead  of  only  two  ages  (e.g.  as  in  Bendick  et  al.  1999),  I  can  better 
understand how age interacts with hiring decisions.  I chose age 62, the early retirement 
age, rather than 65, the full retirement age, as the later endpoint for the survey because 65 
is the age Medicare benefits generally begin and thus could signal lower health care costs 
to potential employers.  I did not use ages earlier than 35 for two reasons.  First, I had to 
limit the total number of ages I used in order to be able to collect a sample size large 
enough to preserve power and since my focus is on the older ages, 35 seemed more 
natural than, for example, 25, as a cutoff.
10  Second, because the current resume standard 
is to display a 10 year job history, I wanted a potential employer to assume that each 
applicant was doing the same thing during that ten year history if there were gaps in the 
resume (e.g. taking care of her family and not going to school).   
Word  of  mouth,  not  formal  advertisement,  accounts  for  most  job  matches, 
according to Holzer (1996).  However, formal methods are still important, especially for 
those lacking social networks.  To get a more representative sample of job openings than 
can be found through the want-ads alone, I added 10 entries per city per week generated 
                                                 
9 http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/note139/original_note139.html 
10 Initially I had chosen 45 as my “start” age, but after I obtained additional funding, I was able to add 35 
before the start of the actual study. 9 
from calling companies randomly chosen from the Verizon yellow pages.
11  The response 
rate  for  call-ins  was  about  half  that  for  want-ads.    However,  the  ratio  of  older 
positive/interview  responses  to  younger  was  very  similar  whether  the  ad  had  been 
generated via want-ad or via call-in
12, thus providing some evidence that the degree of 
differential hiring does not vary much with method used, at least if the method still has 
some degree of formality.  For more information on how these “call-ins” were generated, 
see the Data Appendix.
13 
Resumes were sent in pairs via fax.
14  A coin was flipped each time a pair of 
resumes was sent to determine which would be sent first.  Via the randomness of the 
computer program used to create resumes, employer bias was randomized across each 
high  school  graduation  date.  Employers  who  left  at  least  two  messages  for  the 
prospective candidate were informed in a timely fashion that the candidate had already 
accepted  a  job  elsewhere  so  as  not  to  inconvenience  area  firms.    Overall  I  had  a 
“positive” response rate of 8% in Massachusetts and 10% in Florida and an “interview” 
rate of 4% in Massachusetts and 5% in Florida. 
To  distinguish  between  age  discrimination  and  discrimination  based  on 
differences in human capital or based on perceived gaps in work history, I employed a 
number of design measures.  First, I only sent resumes for women because an employer is 
                                                 
11 I did not add more because the marginal additional call-in was much more time intensive to collect than 
the marginal additional want-ad.   
12 The exact ratios of younger positive responses to older (keeping in mind older contains more dates of 
high school graduation than younger) for Massachusetts are:  .778 positive if want-ad, .770 if call-in; .92 
interview if want-ad, 1.00 if call-in.  For Florida these ratios are:  Positive: .763 if want-ad, .741 if call-in; 
Interview: .906 if want-ad and 1.14 if call-in.  The ratios of negative/null responses follow a similar pattern.      
13 Online resume clearinghouses were also tried, but, since the economy had cooled by the time the 
experiment started, the responses they generated were representative of what one finds in one’s spam filter. 
14 Only two resumes were sent to each employer because an employer would be likely to get suspicious 
should he or she receive four virtually identical resumes in a short time period, whereas two resumes are 
much more likely to be thought of as a coincidence if noticed at all.   10 
more likely to assume that a woman entering or re-entering the labor market has been 
taking  care  of  her  family,  rather  than  returning  from  prison  or  a  long  spell  of 
unemployment, as would be the case for a man.  Second, I limited work histories to 10 
years,  since  conversations  with  human  resource  professionals  and  an  examination  of 
actual resumes suggested that this length is common practice.
15  Third, I indicated that the 
applicant was currently employed at an entry-level job so that all applicants had current 
experience at some form of work (thus diminishing fears that older workers had a longer 
time for human capital to deteriorate).  Finally, I limited my study to entry-level jobs, 
where entry-level is defined as anything which requires at most one year of education 
plus experience combined.  For these jobs, job-specific human capital should be less of a 
concern.   
Although these limitations can only say something about a specific segment of the 
labor  market,  my  controls  are  comparable  enough  that  my  results  can  be  trusted.  
Additionally, I study an important segment of the labor force; the population of older 
women is larger than that of men and older women are more likely to be living in poverty 
than men  (Favreault et al. 2002).  Finally, many entry-level or close to entry-level jobs, 
such  as  cashier  positions,  secretarial  work,  or  home  health  care  tend  to  be  female-
dominated jobs, and thus it would not seem unusual for a woman to apply for these 
                                                 
15 I spoke to human resource professionals from three places—first, several professionals from the hiring 
department from a large university, second, someone who had worked as a human resources professional 
for a business firm, but had recently had a career transition to a post where she helped other people 
determine career transitions, and third, two representatives from a non-profit temporary agency/career 
placement firm.  They all said that ten-year histories are the current gold standard for resumes, although 
they get many resumes that do not look like the standard.  The placement agency said that a big part of their 
job was to get applicants to make their resumes look like the current standard and the university hiring 
department said that using an outdated resume style was often an indication that the applicant was older.  
The university hr department told me that while one was not supposed to put dates of education on 
resumes, most people did, and it was generally in an applicant’s best interest to put down dates of education 
if it was recent. 11 
positions, whereas a man applying to these positions might be considered suspect. 
 
4  Empirical Framework 
 
4.1  Differential Hiring by Age 
To  test  for  differential  hiring  by  age,  I  sent  paired  resumes  matched  on  all 
characteristics except age
16, as indicated by date of high school graduation, to prospective 
employers in the entry-level labor market.  Then I measured the rate of positive responses 
and interview responses by age.  Positive or “callback” responses are those where the 
applicant was called back and given a “positive” sounding response but not specifically 
offered an interview.  Examples included asking the applicant to call back or saying that 
the caller has questions.  They did not include responses that are obviously negative, such 
as information that the position has been filled.  Interview responses specifically asked 
the applicant to call back to set up an interview or to meet in person.   
There are many ways to measure age given my setup.  I looked at high school 
graduation cohort dummies, age as a continuous variable, and a dummy which broke high 
school graduation cohorts into two groups:  older and younger.  The results should be 
similar, but different age configurations give varying amounts of power. 
First I ran differential probits on positive response and interview responses using 
high school graduation dummies as the independent variables of interest:   
 
pr[Responsei =1] = pr[B1(Controls)i + B2(Graduation Cohort) i+ ￿i]                         (1) 
                                                 
16 It is of note that I did not need to match the resumes on characteristics since I use standard differential 
probit methods to analyze the data rather than the audit methodology of a “paired difference of means” test.  
Since I targeted a large number of firms, and the resumes were sent randomly, I should get the same results 
with the regressions I run even had I not matched the resumes.  Indeed, since there are five possible ages, it 
is not even clear what the proper “paired difference of means” test should be. 12 
     = ￿[B1(Controls)i + B2(Graduation Cohort) i] 
 
where  ￿  represents  the  normal  CDF.    The  tables  report  the  marginal  effects,  ￿  prob 
(Responsei =1)/ ￿Xi, where Xi is the vector of explanatory variables.  Here, Response is 
either a positive response or an interview response, i refers to the individual, and the set 
of graduation cohort dummies include indicators for graduating in 1959, 1966, 1971, 
1976 and 1986.   Controls include the number of years of work history out of 10, typos, 
college experience, relevant computer experience, volunteer work, sport, other hobby, 
insurance, flexibility, attendance award, and a set of occupation dummies.  Each firm in 
the  sample  received  two  resumes,  so  results  were  clustered  on  firm.    Since  the 
explanatory variables are dummy variables, this differential probit reports the discrete 
change in the probability of interview for each variable. 
A second way to test for discrimination is to treat age indicated on resume as a 
continuous variable using a probit: 
 
pr[Responsei =1] = ￿[B1(Controls)i+ B2(Age) i]            (2) 
 
Then the marginal effect ￿ prob (Responsei =1)/ ￿Xi represents the discrete change in the 
probability of a positive response or interview for each of controls, and the infinitesimal 
change in the probability of interview for age.  Controls are as reported before. 
Finally,  employers  may  mentally  group  workers  into  “older”  and  “younger” 
categories.  I break up high school graduation dates into two groups, one for workers age 
50 and older and one for workers under age 50, and run a t-test comparing the probability 13 
of being  called back or interviewed for each  group.  To  compare older and  younger 
groups, controlling for resume and industry characteristics, I run an OLS regression for 
each group: 
 
Responsei  t i 2 i 1     ) ( B     ) ( B    e + + = Older Controls         (3) 
 
and retrieve the predicted probability for the response.  Then I run a t-test comparing 
these predicted probabilities for each group.  Alternatively, another test for these two 
groups, again using the probit, is: 
 
pr[Responsei =1] = ￿[ i 2 i 1 ) ( B     ) ( B Older Controls + ]       (4) 
 
Where Older is a dummy indicating that the worker is age 50 or older.  The marginal 
effect  ￿pr(Responsei  =1)/  ￿Xi  represents  the  discrete  change  in  the  probability  of 
interview for each variable.  
 
4.2  Reasons for Differential Hiring by Age 
 
4.2.1  Statistical Discrimination 
My experimental setup enables me to explore different possible reasons for this 
differential  hiring,  or  discrimination.
17    The  first  type  of  discrimination  I  look  at  is 
                                                 
17 I do not differentiate between stereotypes which are true (and thus fit in standard models of statistical 
discrimination, such as Phelps (1972)) and stereotypes which are false, but employers believe to be true.  
One can make the argument that since workers who are hired young often age into the firm, that firms 
which employ larger numbers of workers may have some experience with older workers and are less likely 
to believe false stereotypes.  Additionally, the notion of feedback effects (as in Lundberg and Startz 1983) 
into educational choices is less of an issue because even though older workers may choose training, the 14 
statistical discrimination, which in its most basic definition, is judging an individual on 
group characteristics rather than individual characteristics.  More formally, I assume the 
model by Phelps (1972) as outlined in Aigner  and Cain (1977) where  I assume that 
employers measure expected skill through an indicator y based on the observed true skill 
level q and a measurement error u, thus y = q + u.  I assume that the variance of u is equal 
for the two groups and the variance of q is greater for older workers than for younger.
18  
This model provides a framework where positive information about the ability, that is a 
higher y, helps older workers more than it helps younger workers (the y-E(q) graph will 
have a steeper slope for older workers than for younger).  For example, an indication that 
an older worker has taken a computer class will cause a greater marginal increment to 
expected productivity for the older than younger worker, that is, it will help an older 
worker more than it will help a younger worker.
19 
I tested for statistical discrimination by randomly including items on resumes that 
signaled that the worker did not fit into a standard stereotype.
20  For example, to test 
whether  employers  think  older  workers  are  inflexible  and  unchanging,  I  include  a 
statement that the applicant was flexible or “willing to embrace change.”  To test for the 
effect of these variables on the probability of getting a callback or interview, I interact 
each of these variables with older: 
                                                                                                                                                 
majority of education decisions have already been made.  There may still be feedback effects in terms of 
decisions whether or not to remain in the labor market, however. 
18 Average true ability for the two groups is assumed either equal or that true ability is lower for older 
workers than for younger. 
19 Different assumptions provide a model where the test is less reliable for older workers and thus a positive 
ability signal would help younger workers more than older.  However, there is no reason to assume that 
either younger workers have larger variance in, for example, computer ability or would get more out of a 
basic computer skills course than older workers, unlike the case where many black high schools are 
assumed to be of more variable/worse quality than many white high schools. 
20 Stereotypes examined came from a list of the top 10 reasons for discrimination against older workers 
according to a 1984 survey of 363 companies where hiring managers were asked for reasons that other 
companies might discriminate against older workers (Rhine 1984).  Not all top 10 reasons could be 
explored using this experimental design. 15 
 
pr[Responsei =1] =  ] ) * ( B   ) ( B     ) ( B     ) ( B [ i i 4 i 3 i 2 i 1 SDR Older Older SDR Controls + + + F    (5) 
 
Where SDR is the reason for statistical discrimination which is being tested and Controls 
include the number of years of work history out of 10, typos, college experience, relevant 
computer  experience,  volunteer  work,  sport,  other  hobby,  insurance,  flexibility, 
attendance award, and a set of occupation dummies, except when the reason tested is one 
of those controls.   
Since an interaction term is measuring the difference between the slopes of the 
SDR term when Older = 0 and when Older = 1, I can measure the same results by 
running the regressions separately for each group.  I also run regressions on just the 
controls and variables of interest (not including an age-related variable) separately for 
older  and  younger  groups  and  compare  coefficients.    This  format  is  identical  to  the 
interaction: 
 
pr[Responsei =1]  =  ] ) * ( B   ) ( B     ) ( B     ) ( B [ i i 4 i 3 i 2 i 1 SDR Older Older SDR Controls + + + F    (6) 
 
Where SDR here is a vector of reasons for statistical discrimination and other variables 
are as described earlier.  Showing regressions separately for Older = 1 and Older = 0 has 
the benefit of efficiently showing multiple interactions at the same time. 
  Another method to differentiate between statistical discrimination and employer 
taste-based  discrimination  using  the  presence  of  a  human  resources  department  is 
described in the next section. 16 
 
4.2.2  Taste-Based Discrimination 
 
Employer 
Human resource professionals may have less taste-based discrimination because 
of training and knowledge of discrimination laws, although they might be more likely to 
practice  statistical  discrimination  through  learning.
21    Thus,  I  study  employer 
discrimination by interacting a dummy indicating whether or not a company has a human 
resources department, HR, with age: 
 
pr[Responsei =1] =  ] ) * ( B   ) ( B     ) ( B     ) ( B [ i i 4 i 3 i 2 i 1 HR Older Older HR Controls + + + F     (7)    
 
where  HR  is  a  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  or  not  a  company  has  a  human 
resources department.  Older and Controls are as described before. 
 
Employee 
My  tests  for  employee  taste-based  discrimination  and  customer  taste-based 
discrimination rely on the assumption that people are less likely to discriminate against 
those  in  their  own  group
22.    To  study  employee  discrimination,  I  interact  age  with 
Over50Work, the percentage of people employed in the area where the business is located 
over the age of 50: 
                                                 
21 Unlike the usual case for race or gender, one’s age status does change while employed.  Thus an 
employer can end up observing the productivity of a group of older workers even if it never hired older 
workers. 
22 To my knowledge, the only economics paper differentiating between taste-based and statistical 
discrimination that does not use this, or a similar assumption for race or gender is John List’s “The Nature 
and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence from the Field” 2004 QJE paper.  
Unfortunately, the set-up he uses in that paper is not applicable to this type of audit experiment.   17 
pr[Responsei=1] 
 
= ] ) 50 * ( B   ) ( B     ) 50 ( B     ) ( B [ i i 4 i 3 i 2 i 1 Work Over Older Older Work Over Controls + + + F   (8) 
 
Here Over50Work is a continuous variable indicating the percentage of people over the 
age of 50 who work in the firm’s place of work PUMA, as indicated by the 2000 census.  
Controls and Older are defined as above. 
  
Customer 
  My test for customer taste-based discrimination is similar to that of employee 
taste-based discrimination, except that instead of looking at the percentage of people 
employed in an area, I look at the percentage of people who reside in the area where the 
business is located: 
pr[Responsei=1] 
 
= ] ) 50 * ( B   ) ( B     ) 50 ( B     ) ( B [ i i 4 i 3 i 2 i 1 Over Older Older Over Controls + + + F      (9) 
 
Here Over50 is a continuous variable indicating the percentage of people over the age of 
50 who live in the firm’s zipcode, as indicated by the 2000 census.  Since people who 
work in services and sales are more likely to interact with consumers, I also run equation 
(9) using only service and sales occupations. 
  
5  Results 
 
5.1  Differential Hiring by Age 18 
Figures 1a and 1b show an upward trend for the positive response based on date 
of high school graduation, as in equation (1).  This trend is much more marked using 
interview as the dependent variable.  Although no two adjacent years are statistically 
significantly  different  from  the  0  to  5  percent  level,  the  results  are  suggestive.    In 
Massachusetts, the interview results show a statistically significant difference at the 5 
percent level between the oldest, hsgrad59, and youngest hsgrad86.  Interview results 
may be stronger than positive for two reasons.  First, not all “positive” responses may 
actually be positive—some asking for more information could be preludes to rejection, 
thus producing measurement error.  Secondly, more subtle forms of discrimination, such 
as  calling  one  person  back  more  enthusiastically  than  another,  are  less  likely  to  be 
discovered than overtly failing to call back the older candidate.  In fact, the caller may not 
even realize that he or she has treated the candidates differently. 
  The  most  significant  results  are  found  breaking  up  age  categories  into 
“older/younger” groups where older is defined to be age 50, 55, and 62 and younger is 
defined to be ages 35 and 45.
23  Table 1 describes t-test results comparing the mean 
response rates for these two age categories with controls as calculated in (3) and without 
controls.    For  callbacks,  there  is  a  difference  of  1.5  percentage  points,  or  19%,  in 
Massachusetts  and  1.7  percentage  points,  or  18%,  in  Florida.    For  interviews,  these 
differences  are  1.6  percentage  points,  or  42%,  for  Massachusetts  and  2.0  percentage 
points, or 46%, for Florida.
24  The average younger job seeker in Massachusetts needs to 
                                                 
23 I also tried breaking up older and younger categories by placing 50 in the younger category (older2 and 
younger2) and leaving 50 out altogether (older3 and younger3).  Results were similar across categories but, 
defining 50 as older produced the strongest results.   
24 If I take the lowest point in the confidence interval for younger workers and divide that by the highest 
point in the confidence interval for older workers, and then do the same with the highest point for younger 
workers and lowest point for older workers, I get a range of a younger worker being -.05 to 113% more 
likely to get an interview in Massachusetts and -.02 to 117% more likely to get an interview in Florida. 19 
file, on average, 11 ads to get one callback whereas an older needs to file 13.  A younger 
seeker needs to file 19 ads for one interview request and an older job seeker 27.  In 
Florida, a younger worker needs to file 9 and an older worker 11 ads to get a positive 
response.  These numbers are 16 and 23 respectively for an interview response.  A probit 
including older as an age dummy, as in equation (4), results in a negative and significant 
coefficient  for  older  for  interviews  in  Massachusetts  and  Florida  and  callbacks  in 
Massachusetts, as shown in Table 2. 
A final way of looking at the effect on age is to actually regress on age as if it 
were a continuous variable as in equation (2).  This method provides more power than 
using age dummies.  Table 2 shows that the marginal effect coefficient on age is negative 
but and significant at the 5% level for positive responses in Massachusetts but negative 
and not significant in Florida.  That is, for each additional year of age, a worker is .07% 
less likely to be called back in Massachusetts and between .04% and .06% less likely to 
be called back in Florida.
25  This effect is both negative and significant at the 5% level for 
the interview response, with each additional year of age causing a worker to be .07% less 
likely to be called back for an interview in Massachusetts and between .067 and -0.09 
less likely to be called for an interview in Florida.  Thus there is differential interviewing 
by age.  Specifically, assuming linearity
26, in Massachusetts, the mean applicant would 
have to answer 1 additional ad to receive a callback for each additional 10 years of age, 
and 4.5 additional ads to receive an interview request.  In Florida, each additional 10 
                                                 
25 Depending on whether or not controls are included.  Since employers may treat certain characteristics 
differently depending on age, in a non-linear probit model the coefficient of age can change based on 
whether or not they are included, even if the characteristics are randomized across resumes.  In ordinary 
least squares model the coefficient would not change.  Additionally, although age is uncorrelated with the 
controls by design, in a finite sample there may still be correlation induced by chance.   
26 An age squared term came up insignificant in probit regressions.  However, I cannot reject a cubic age 
specification for the interview response in the Florida set.  The cubic age specification is not significant in 
the Massachusetts set. 20 
years of age would require 5 more ads to produce a callback and 3.5 more ads to produce 
an interview (interview responses have a lower base rate, so even though the percentage 
decrease by age is more interviews, .067% rather than .04%, this decrease translates into 
a worker having to apply to 10.7 rather than 10.2 ads for each  year of age to get a 
callback and 23.2 rather than 22.9 ads for each year for an interview). 
  Companies could also discriminate in more subtle ways than failing to call back 
or  to  ask  for  an  interview.      Other  possible  outcomes  are  calling  back  the  younger 
applicant sooner than the older applicant, or calling back the younger applicant multiple 
times but only calling the older applicant once.  Although there are examples where 
either  of  these  outcomes  is  the  case,  on  average  there  is  not  statistically  significant 
discrimination for either of these possibilities (results not shown).  I also briefly looked at 
actual negative responses, but not only were there very few of these, but I have reason to 
believe that when negative responses  are sent  out, many of them are  sent via postal 
mail.
27    Since  I  do  not  have  information  on  postal  responses  for  the  majority  of 
applications, it is not feasible to use negative responses as an outcome.  
 
5.2  Reasons for Differential Hiring by Age 
Economists  recognize  two  main  categories  of  discrimination:    statistical 
discrimination and taste-based discrimination.  Statistical discrimination can occur based 
on observables, such as work history or typographical errors, or unobservables, such as 
energy or ability to learn.  In my experimental setup, observables are identical for each 
                                                 
27 In the Massachusetts part of the sample, I was able to collect mail at one of the two addresses that were 
randomly assigned to resumes.  Through this collection, I did not find any positive or interview responses, 
but did receive some negative responses.  The majority of written responses were post-cards stating receipt 
of the application.  There were a few requesting more information, but these also requested more 
information via phone or email as well. 21 
resume pair sent and thus cannot be responsible for the differential hiring.  To look at the 
effect of unobservables, I included items on the resumes to signal that the applicant did 
not fit a number of stereotypes cited by managers as reasons firms might be reluctant to 
hire older workers (Rhine 1984).  The effects of these variables are discussed in more 
detail below and are detailed in Table 3 which gives results from running equation (5) 
separately by older status. 
 
5.2.1  Statistical Discrimination 
Employers may statistically discriminate because they fear that older workers will 
“cost”  more  in  terms  of  absences  and  benefits.    To  test  whether  or  not  companies 
statistically discriminate against older workers because they assume older workers will 
have more absences, I introduced an item on the resume saying that the applicant has won 
an attendance award.  This variable is positive but not significant at the 5% level.  If 
anything,  attendance  awards  help  younger  workers  more  than  older  in  terms  of 
magnitude.    To  see  whether  or  not  higher  health  insurance  costs  are  a  reason  older 
workers  are  not  hired,  I  put  in  the  statement  that  a  worker  does  not  need  insurance 
coverage.
28      Although  having  insurance  seems  to  help  getting  a  callback  overall  in 
Massachusetts, nothing can be said by age at the 5% level.  Already having insurance 
increases the likelihood of getting a callback or interview in Massachusetts, but helps 
only  younger  workers  and  may  hurt  older  workers  in  Florida,  although,  again,  these 
                                                 
28 Although, according to Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Massachusetts (personal communication), health 
insurance costs generally stay the same for women until the age of 65 (the possibility of pregnancy goes 
down as a woman ages) there is some doubt that human resource managers are aware of the fact.  
Additionally, insurance costs may not follow the same pattern in all cases.   Scott et al. (1995) find that 
older age hiring is lower in firms that offer health insurance and in firms where health insurance is more 
expensive.  However, firms that offer benefits such as health insurance are different than firms which do 
not.  For example, they tend to be larger and have steeper earnings profiles as well (Idson and Oi 1999).  
Firms with different healthcare costs may also differ in ways not exogenous to employee age. 22 
results are not significant.  Employers could also fear that older workers may be less 
likely to have reliable transportation, and thus may be tardy or absent from work for this 
reason.  There is no evidence that commute time, matched by zipcode to place of work 
PUMA affects older or younger workers differently (results not shown).   
Employers  may  also  worry  that  older  workers  will  not  be  as  productive  as 
younger.  First, they may believe that older workers’ knowledge and skills are obsolete.  
For  this  reason  I  added  a  variable  indicating  that  the  worker  had  gotten  a  computer 
certificate in 1986 (which would be outdated), 1996 or 2002/2003 when such skills would 
be relevant and recent.  Although not significant, relevant computer experience helps 
younger workers to get interviews in Florida more than older workers.  However, in 
Massachusetts, it helps older workers more than younger, although the interaction term is 
only significant at the 40% level.
29  Vocational training
30 helps younger workers more 
than  older  workers  to  get  both  callbacks  and  interviews.    An  interaction  between 
vocational training and older (not shown) gives this result to be significant at the 5% 
level for Florida, but not for Massachusetts.  Second, employers may be worried that 
older workers lack energy.  To test this reason, I introduced an item on the resume saying 
the  applicant  plays  sports.    For  the  most  part,  this  variable  is  not  significant.    It  is 
significant and negative for the callback response for younger workers in Massachusetts 
and significant and positive for the interview response for younger workers in Florida.  
Although an interaction term shows putting sports on the resume to hurt older workers 
less than younger workers, this finding is only significant for positive responses at the 
                                                 
29 Interaction results have also been done using the Norton adjustment, and results still hold (Norton et al. 
2002).  Magnitudes may change, but signs and 5% significance do not. 
30 Note that occupation and vocational training are mechanically related in this experiment because 
vocational training was only given to resumes for which it was required (such as dental assisting or 
nursing). 23 
20% level in Massachusetts.   
Third, previous research has suggested that older women use volunteer work as a 
“stepping stone” to labor market work (Stephen 1991), and, indeed, I find that having 
volunteer work listed helps older women more than younger.
31  Fourth, Bendick (1996) 
found that the biggest help to an older worker’s resume was to signal that he or she was 
flexible or “willing to embrace change.”  Although only significant at the 10% level for 
Massachusetts, I found that having this statement on a resume hurts an older worker, but 
does not hurt a younger worker.
32  This difference in findings may be because the AARP 
has been recommending that older workers put such statements on their resumes since the 
time of Bendick’s study and thus this statement now signals that the worker is old.   
Finally, experience may interact with age as a form of statistical discrimination.  
Employers  may  assume  that  older  workers  have  more  experience,  or  they  may  be 
prejudiced against an older worker if she does not have more experience than a younger 
worker.  I looked at this issue in two different ways.  First, I looked to see what effect 
having experience in the same occupation for which the worker was applying had for the 
different  age  groups.    Although  no  interactions  of  same  experience  with  age  are 
significant at the 5% level (not shown), having occupational experience listed on the 
resume similar to occupation being applied to the helps younger workers more than older 
workers  as  shown  in  Table  4.    However,  a  different  effect  is  found  for  implied 
experience—that is, when the want-ad requires experience
33; older workers were hurt less 
                                                 
31 The interaction of older and volunteer is positive and significant at the 25% for positive outcomes and 
30% level for interview outcomes in Florida, but only at the 46% level for interview in Massachusetts.  
32 The interaction of older and flexible is significant at the 14% level for the interview variable in 
Massachusetts and at the 70% level for Florida.  
33 Admissible want-ads could include requirements of up to a year of experience, whether the applicant had 
it on the resume or not. 24 
than  younger  workers,  as  shown  in  Tables  4,  although  again,  this  finding  is  not 
significant at the 5% level.  Thus there is slight evidence that employers are more likely 
to give older workers the benefit of the doubt in terms of experience, but only when 
neither applicant lists the required experience on the resume.  Otherwise, having the 
required  experience  may  help  younger  workers  more  than  older.    This  possibility 
suggests that the entry-level labor market may be different in terms of age discrimination 
from markets requiring more experience. 
 
5.2.2  Taste-Based Discrimination 
 
Employer 
One form of taste-based discrimination is employer discrimination, in which  the 
employer him or herself (or those doing the hiring) prefers one group over another based 
on  his  or  her  own  tastes.    Human  resource  professionals  may  have  less  taste-based 
discrimination because of training and knowledge of discrimination laws, although they 
might be more likely to practice statistical discrimination based on learning from past 
hires.  Bendick (1994) assumes that firm size is a proxy for having a human resources 
department and finds that there is no link between race discrimination and firm size.  I 
found no link between having a human resources department and being more or less 
discriminatory  using  equation
34  (7).    In  my  study,  firms  with  human  resources 
departments may be more likely to interview younger workers, which would support the 
case  of  statistical  rather  than  taste-based  discrimination,  but  this  finding  is  not 
                                                 
34 I also have a rough variable for firm size (fewer than 15 employees, 15-19 employees, 20 or more 
employees).  I find no relationship between firm size and hiring practices. 25 
significant.
35  The controlled coefficient on the interaction term between Older and HR 
for Florida for the interview outcome is -0.007with a standard error of 0.018 and this 
coefficient for Massachusetts is -0.017 with a standard error of 0.0195.
36   
 
Employee 
Another  form  of  taste-based  discrimination  occurs  when  employees  prefer  to 
work with members of a certain group.  Younger employees might prefer to not to work 
with older employees, especially when the older employee is in a subordinate position.  
To test for this type of discrimination, I match zipcodes from my dataset to place of work 
PUMA information on worker age from the census and look at the effect of percentage of 
workers over 40, over 50 and over 61 employed in the PUMA.
37  I found no effect of the 
age of a company’s workforce on the differential hiring by age, thus providing no support 
for employee taste-based discrimination (results not shown).
38  However, this measure 
may be too crude, as it matches zipcode to place of work PUMA information rather than 
using the percentage of workers by age in a firm. 
 
Customer 
A  final  source  of  taste-based  discrimination  comes  from  the  consumer  base.  
Consumers may prefer to buy from or interact with employees who are like them.  To test 
                                                 
35 Another possible way of measuring employer taste-based discrimination is to examine the hiring 
interaction between the ages of employers or human resources professionals and applicants.  However, I 
have been unable to collect information on employer age.  Additionally, just because an employer is a 
member of a group does not mean that he or she will not discriminate against other members.  For example, 
Dick Clark, age 76, was recently sued for age discrimination  
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/02/dick.clark.sued.ap/. 
36  A Norton correction does not change the sign or significance of these effects.  The main effects for 
Florida are -0.008 for older and 0.010 for HR.  In Massachusetts, these effects are -0.021 for older and 
0.018 for HR. 
37 This effect of older workers in a company influencing the age of new hires is not mechanical because 
older employees may have been hired young and aged with the company. 
38 For the percentage over age 50 interaction with older, the FL coefficient is .00139 with a standard error 
of .00286 and the MA coefficient is -.660 with a standard error of .478.   26 
for this type of discrimination, I used the census to get age profiles of zipcodes in Florida 
and Massachusetts and matched them to the zipcodes of the companies applied to in the 
study.  Taste-based discrimination should be even higher in occupations where there is 
interaction  with  the  public,  such  as  in  sales  and  service.    There  is  no  evidence  of 
consumer taste-based discrimination; areas with higher percentages over the age of 50 are 
more likely to call back or to interview in general and these results are stronger for 
younger workers than for older.  The results are similar when only service and sales 
positions are looked at  (results not shown).  Thus there is no evidence that  younger 
consumer bases prefer workers in the same age group.  
 
6  Implications 
  These differential responses have real implications for older potential workers.  
One may wonder, “So older workers have to send in a few more applications to get an 
interview, so what?”  Aside from the psychological implications of implied rejection, 
there are economic consequences to this sort of differential that are more severe for some 
occupations than others.  First, the number of applications sent to receive an interview 
vary by occupation.  Using general occupation categories, the number of applications 
needed for an interview ranges from a low of 5.5 for younger workers and 10 for older 
workers in healthcare positions in Florida to a high of 32 ads for younger workers and 72 
ads  for  older  workers  seeking  clerical  positions  in  Massachusetts.
39    Second,  many 
occupations have a limited number of positions advertised each week.  For example, on a 
                                                 
39 With “low” and “high,” I am only including general occupation categories that have at least 200 resumes 
sent.  There are some occupational categories with low sample sizes, such as professional/technical non-
healthcare (mostly pre-school teachers) in Florida that received no responses for older workers, and thus 
would, by the metric used, require an infinite number of resumes to receive an interview.  However, only 
51 resumes were sent to p/t non-healthcare positions in Florida.  There were 558 healthcare resumes sent in 
Florida and 1057 clerical resumes sent in Massachusetts. 27 
randomly chosen Sunday in Florida, there were 34 LPN jobs being offered but only 8 
pre-school teacher positions.  For some professions, such as jewelry appraiser (which 
requires 6 months to a year of training), it is possible to call almost every jewelry store in 
the area over the course of a year and only net one interview.
40  Finally, given that the 
wages for many of these occupations are not very high (often minimum wage), it is likely 
that persons seeking these jobs also do not have a large amount of wealth to finance an 
extended job search, especially if they cannot receive employment benefits.   
What does this mean for older vs. younger workers?  Conditional on getting an 
interview response, it takes, on average, 8 days to be offered an interview.  I have not 
been able to find information on the number of interviews it takes to get an entry-level 
job, but one online firm
41 finds that it takes 7-10 interviews on average for a college 
graduate to obtain a job offer.  Using a back of the envelope calculation with one of the 
professions most likely to be hired, a new licensed practical nurse
42 sending out ~30 
applications a week can expect 3 interviews a week as an older worker and 6 interviews a 
week as a younger worker.  Assuming it takes 7-10 interviews to land a job, a younger 
worker could expect an employment offer in a little over a week, and an older worker 3 
weeks.  But this is the best case scenario.  An older worker attempting to find clerical 
work could file close to 100 applications per week and expect to be given an offer 7 to 10 
weeks later (a younger worker would get an offer in half that time), using the same back 
of the envelope calculation, and that is only assuming that there are 100 unique new 
clerical ads each week, which, since a large number of ads are run at least two weeks in a 
                                                 
40 Which was the case in Florida. 
41 www.onestop.com 
42 A profession which takes 1 year of training and had a median salary of $31,440 in 2002 according to the 
BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook.  http://bls.gov/oco/ocos102.htm 28 
row, is unlikely.  For someone who needs to work because of a lack of savings, several 
months without income could be critical. 
 
7  Concluding Comments 
This study clearly shows differential interviewing by age for entry-level positions 
in contemporary labor markets.  I found that younger applicants are 44% more likely to 
be requested for an interview in Massachusetts and 43% more likely in Florida.  The 
extent of discrimination against older workers is similar to that of discrimination against 
women or blacks.
43  I found no evidence of taste-based discrimination.  I found some 
evidence for statistical discrimination against workers along a few dimensions, such as 
skills obsolescence, as signaled by adding relevant computer experience to a resume (but 
only in Massachusetts).  Many resume items helped younger workers but either hurt or 
did not affect older workers.   
In  the  current  labor  market,  older  workers  face  greater  difficulty  obtaining 
interviews for entry-level positions than do  younger workers.  The demand for older 
compared  to  workers  is  a  function  of  taste-based  and  statistical  discrimination,  as 
discussed  above,  but  also  possibly  employer  misinformation  and  market  conditions.  
These forces may change over time as the labor force ages.  Employers may be willing to 
hire  more  older  workers  as  younger  workers  become  relatively  scare.    However,  as 
younger workers become scarce, the relative demand for them should rise, assuming 
                                                 
43 Neumark et. al (1996) find evidence of 47% differential interview requests against female waitstaff in 
high-price restaurants and 40% towards female waitstaff in lower-price restaurants.  Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) find that applicants with white sounding names are 50 percent more likely to be called 
for an interview than applicants with black sounding names.  It is somewhat difficult to compare the extent 
of the magnitude of age discrimination to race or gender discrimination, since age is not a binary variable 
and breaking into older and younger categories can be done arbitrarily.  I might have found more had I 
been comparing, for example, 32 year olds to 90 year olds only.   29 
older  and  younger  workers  are  imperfect  substitutes.    Demand  for  all  workers  may 
change  as  the  national  economy  grows  or  shrinks.    I  chose  St.  Petersburg,  FL,  as  a 
microcosm for the future, with its top-heavy age structure, and found that older workers 
in this area have very similar labor market outcomes to Boston, MA in terms of both 
relative demand and time out of work in my back of the envelope calculation.  However, 
my study of St. Petersburg is only a snapshot of a specific labor market at a specific point 
in time.  Perception of what ages constitute “older” may also change with increases in 
longevity  and  cognitive  ability  and  as  institutional  bounds  such  as  the  “Normal 
Retirement Age” for Social Security are increased.  Future policy implementation will 
have to take these possible changes into account. 
Future research needs to be done both exploring other labor markets, such as the 
non-entry-level market, and pinpointing additional reasons for statistical discrimination.   
In  non-entry-level  positions,  there  may  be  taste-based  discrimination  against  younger 
workers supervising older workers, which would suggest that there would be less age 
discrimination against older workers in these markets.  For example, managerial positions 
in Florida (but not Massachusetts) tended to prefer older workers, interviewing 4% of 
older applicants and 1% of younger workers.  I also found differences in differential 
hiring between occupations; Blue-collar and male-dominated occupations in the sample 
tend to prefer older workers to younger.  Since these occupations in my sample tend to be 
clustered in dying industries, there may be a bias towards hiring workers with shorter 
expected future work-lives. 
Another reason for discrimination against older workers that could not be tested in 
this set-up is that older workers cost more because they can sue employers under the Age 30 
Discrimination  in  Employment  Act.    Lahey  (2005),  looks  at  the  effect  of  age 
discrimination laws on older workers.  Although it finds that these laws have a significant 
and negative effect on older white men, it does not find a similar effect for older women.  
Since the current cohort of older women is unlikely to sue, employers may not take 
possible litigation into consideration in the hiring process. 
This study provides evidence that the demand for labor from older workers is 
smaller than that for younger workers.  Simply encouraging older workers to reenter the 
labor force will not guarantee that they will be able to find jobs in a timely manner, if at 
all.  This study also has important implications for women who are most likely to need 
additional work—those with little work experience who unexpectedly need to enter the 
labor market, such as widows, those whose husbands have lost jobs and cannot find 
employment, or divorcees.  Although there are more older women than older men, the 
majority of economic surveys on aging and work focus on a random sample of men and, 
if they include women at all, only include spouses.  Any policy which depends on older 
people finding work to maintain their quality of living, such as changing social security 
benefits, needs to consider this demand side.   
 
8 Data Appendix 
The  use  of  a  computer  program  to  randomly  generate  items  to  create  many 
different  possible  resumes  is  a  large  improvement  over  earlier  studies.    First,  unlike 
studies where a limited number of resumes are used, it lessens (and can test for) the 
possibility that an employer is reacting to something specific in the particular resume sent 
out.  Additionally, because there is no human  interaction with the resume during its 
creation, the possibility of injecting subjectivity into the process of matching resumes 31 
with job openings is completely eliminated.  Resumes and resume items (other than the 
objective) are truly randomly assigned to job openings, eliminating many possibilities for 
bias.  
The  computer  program  used  to  prepare  and  match  resumes  is  best  explained 
through  example.    Say  that  a  job  vacancy  for  a  receptionist  has  been  found.    The 
researcher will open the computer program specifying jobs for a receptionist position.  
The computer program will first randomly choose two of the possible women to apply to 
the job, for example, Linda Jones (age 45) and Mary E. Smith (age 62).  It will then pick 
an objective statement for Linda (“To obtain a position as a receptionist”) and a matching 
one for Mary (“To secure a position as receptionist”).   Similarly it will match work 
histories and high school.  Next it will decide whether or not to test for one or more of the 
possible reasons for discrimination through adding items to the resume.  As an example, 
to see if lack of energy is a reason employers discriminate against older people, the 
computer will put under hobbies that Linda Jones is a tennis player, then designate Mary 
E. Smith as a racquetball player.  Regressions found no significant difference between 
response rates for tennis and racquetball players, or any of the other  possible paired 
choices.   
Variations on the resumes ranged as follows.  Candidates were named Mary E. 
Smith or Linda Jones.
44  The objectives included sales positions, office positions, entry-
level nursing positions, wait staff positions and other entry-level or close to entry-level 
positions that require only a year of combined post-high school education and experience 
                                                 
44 Mary gets a middle initial because in my experience, and the experience of those I’ve spoken with, 
anyone over the age of 30 whose first name is Mary always adds her middle name or middle initial, 
especially if her last name is also common (unless there’s a “Peter, Paul, and…” in front of the Mary).  I 
have not had the same experience with Linda as a first name, although when asked, Linda’s middle initial is 
M. 32 
to obtain.  All resumes had the applicant currently working at a job.  Dates of high school 
graduation included 1959, 1966, 1971, 1976 and 1986.  High schools chosen were Ames 
High School in Ames City, Iowa and DeKalb High School in DeKalb, IL.  Some resumes 
had  experience  in  computer  classes,  either  from  1986,  which  makes  such  experience 
obsolete, 1996, when the experience is useful but not recent or 2002/2003 when the 
experience is both useful and recent.  Current employment varied as well and ranged 
from cashier work to secretarial work with a couple of “unusual” jobs possible, such as 
those giving fork-lift experience.  Volunteer work included work at homeless shelters or 
food banks.  Hobbies included some combination of tennis, racquetball, gardening and 
crafting.  An attendance award could also be listed.  All resumes had email addresses 
listed.
45  Appendix Tables 1a and 1b show how resume characteristics were distributed 
across high school graduation dates. 
Typos were introduced to the study in two different ways:  First, purposefully 
coded typographical errors were programmed into the resume machine during the first 
half of the study when there was more hiring in general.  These typos were representative 
of those found in actual resumes—they included things like missing punctuation marks, 
large words that had been misspelled and inconsistent indentation.  The second kind of 
error was inadvertently introduced when applying for a job that did not fit one of the 
major job categories in the resume program.  These errors included things like putting an 
“a” where an “an” should be or other similar mistakes that native English speakers do not 
                                                 
45 The census finds that 47% of householders age 45 to 64 have internet access at home 
(http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p23-207.pdf).  Additionally, places which help people to find work, 
such as Project Able, strongly encourage applicants to get email addresses and many job finding sites 
actually take seekers through the steps of signing up for a free hotmail account.  Finally, adding an email 
address to an older resume is likely to work in the older resume’s favor, and thus I should find even lower 
acceptance rates for older workers without adding email addresses. 33 
normally make.  There are many fewer of these errors and they tend to be most prevalent 
in Florida and when there was a research assistant regime change. 
Call-ins were performed because many entry-level jobs are never advertised via 
want-ad.  I could not use walk-ins because a pilot study showed that, not only were walk-
ins  time  consuming,  but  many  of  them  generated  actual  paper  job  applications  with 
questions whose answers were difficult to control, but hurt an application if left blank, for 
example, “Describe your ideal job situation.”  Additionally, there was a worry that a 
manager would connect the person picking up or turning in an application with the job 
applicant, rather than looking at the resume characteristics alone.  To generate a call-in, a 
young woman randomly generated an entry in the telephone book.  Since large firms tend 
to have more entries in the telephone book than small firms, and certain industries, such 
as law offices, tend to have multiple entries, call-ins tend to have a slight bias towards 
generating these firms.  However, they do a better job of generating small firms than 
want-ads.    The  company  was  then  called  and  asked,  “Hello,  my  name  is  Elizabeth 
Williams, I was wondering, do you have any entry-level jobs available?”  If the person on 
the phone did not understand, the caller followed with, “Are you hiring for any entry-
level positions?”  If the person on the phone said no, the caller moved on to another 
phone book entry.  If the person on the phone said yes, the caller tried to elicit a fax 
number or email address and later generated a resume and sent it.  If there was no fax or 
email available, the caller first checked to see if there was an online application, and if 
there was, she sent a resume via that method.  Otherwise, the caller coded the company as 
“no fax/email available” and generated another telephone book entry. 
Response rates differ somewhat by method of application as shown in Appendix 34 
Table 2.  Want-ads are more likely to get both positive and interview responses than Call-
ins, faxes slightly more likely than emails.  There are some occupational differences in 
response rates between Massachusetts and Florida.  For example, professional/technical 
non healthcare positions, which are mostly preschool teaching positions, were 1.5 times 
as likely to hire younger workers in Massachusetts, but there was a much smaller number 
of positions advertised in Florida, so the sample size could not be compared.  There was 
no difference in age for hiring healthcare workers, mostly Licensed Nurse Practitioners 
and Certified Nurse Assistants, in Massachusetts, but Florida healthcare agencies were 
twice as likely to hire younger workers (results not shown).  The composition of jobs 
available differs as well, as can be seen under “firm characteristics” in Appendix Tables 
1a and 1b.  A quarter of the jobs available in both metropolitan areas were clerical work, 
but the Boston area was much more likely to hire sales workers, at 24.5% of openings 
compared to 19.5% in the St. Petersburg-Tampa area.  Entry-level professional, education 
and managerial jobs were also more likely to be advertised in Massachusetts whereas 
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Marginal Effect of Age on Likelihood of a Response
    Massachusetts          Florida
Positive Interview Positive Interview
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
age -0.00077 -0.00071 -0.00042 -0.00073
(0.00038)* (0.00029)* (0.00045) (0.00032)*
older=50+ -0.015 -0.016 -0.014 -0.017
(0.007)* (0.005)** (0.008)+ (0.006)**
hs59 -0.020 -0.016 -0.002 -0.009
(0.010)* (0.006)** (0.013) (0.008)
hs66 -0.007 -0.010 -0.011 -0.025
(0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007)**
hs71 -0.014 -0.020 -0.003 -0.009
(0.009) (0.006)** (0.012) (0.008)
hs76 0.002 -0.004 0.017 0.001
(0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008)
Observations 4229 4229 4229 4229 4229 4229 3769 3769 3769 3618 3618 3618
Ho
†  6.45  4.02 5.00  12.22  6.30 10.26 5.70 0.88  3.16 12.08 4.82  7.14
Ho: p-value ( 0.1680) ( 0.0450) (0.0254) (0.0158) ( 0.0121) (0.0014) ( 0.2226)( 0.3483) ( 0.0752) (0.0168) (0.0282) (0.0075)
Notes: Results reported are marginal effects from a probit equation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  The dummy hs86 is omitted.  
Controls include years out of 10 in the labor force,  years out of 10 in the labor force squared, workgap, college,  computer classes
since 1996, volunteering, sports, already has insurance, flexible, attendance award, typos, and the following occupational dummies: 
professional, education, health, manager, sales, craftsman, operative, service, and laborer.   For the interview outcome, education and 
laborer predict failure perfectly and 18 and 133 observations are dropped respectively.  Results are clustered on firm.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  Ho†: Age effects are all zero41 
            Table 3
Marginal Effect of Resume Characteristics on Likelihood of Response
      Massachusetts            Florida
Callback Interview Callback Interview
All Older Younger All Older Younger All Older Younger All Older Younger
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
work gap -0.013 -0.005 -0.025 -0.005 0.001 -0.014 -0.002 0.009 -0.019 0.002 0.001 0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
vocational train. 0.077 0.063 0.100 0.035 0.015 0.081 0.127 0.124 0.138 0.047 0.036 0.070
(0.019)** (0.022)** (0.036)** (0.014)* (0.013) (0.032)* (0.024)** (0.031)** (0.037)** (0.016)** (0.020) (0.028)*
computer 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.009 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.025
(0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.007)** (0.008) (0.012)*
volunteer 0.030 0.027 0.036 0.013 0.015 0.010 -0.001 0.008 -0.015 -0.011 -0.005 -0.020
(0.008)** (0.009)** (0.013)** (0.006)* (0.006)* (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
sports -0.013 -0.004 -0.026 -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.017 0.012 0.026
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013)* (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.006)** (0.008) (0.011)*
insurance 0.016 0.015 0.019 0.009 0.007 0.013 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 -0.007 -0.011 -0.002
(0.008)* (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
flexible -0.010 -0.016 0.000 -0.002 -0.008 0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.019 -0.007 -0.009 -0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
attendance 0.009 0.004 0.016 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
typo 0.011 0.016 0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.010 0.011 0.003 0.022 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
Observations 4229 2560 1669 4229 2560 1669 3773 2279 1478 3755 2267 1427
Ho
† 49.87  24.70  29.97 21.55 11.92  17.52  52.16  29.82 28.47 32.27  13.56 22.20
p-value ( 0.0000) ( 0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0058) ( 0.1548) (0.0252) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) ( 0.0941) (0.0046)
standard dev.
‡
0.056 0.055 0.064 0.031 0.030 0.039 0.067 0.055 0.094 0.042 0.031 0.064
Notes:  Results reported are marginal effects from a probit equation.  Additional controls not shown are occupational controls for professional,
education, healthcare, manager, sales, craftsman, operative, service, laborer and clerical. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; †Ho:  Resume characteristics effects are all zero; ‡ Standard deviation of predicted callback.42 
Table 4
The Effect of Experience on Interview Requests
Massachusetts Florida Massachusetts Florida
All Older Younger All Older Younger All Older Younger All Older Younger
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
same  0.016 0.012 0.025 0.011 0.002 0.029
 experience (0.008)* (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
experience -0.021 -0.017 -0.025 -0.027 -0.026 -0.030
 required (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.009)** (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.011)**
Observations 3651 2207 1444 3266 1980 1168 4228 2560 1668 3755 2267 1427
Notes:   Results reported are marginal effects from a probit equation.   Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Controls include years out of 10 in labor force,  (years out of 10 in labor force squared), workgap, college, computer classes 
since 1996, volunteering, sports, already has insurance, flexible, attendance award, typos, and the following  occupational
dummies:  professional, education, health, manager, sales, craftsman, operative, service and laborer.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 43 
Appendix Table 1a
     Summary Statistics: Massachusetts 
Variables All older younger 1959 1966 1971 1976 1986
resume characteristics:
hsgrad 1971.561 1965.625 1980.667 1959.000 1966.000 1971.000 1976.000 1986.000
yrs of 10 in LF  5.590 5.567 5.624 5.468 5.692 5.522 5.697 5.542
typo 0.163 0.171 0.151 0.118 0.198 0.188 0.181 0.117
college 0.196 0.195 0.197 0.204 0.203 0.177 0.212 0.180
computer 0.520 0.523 0.515 0.512 0.533 0.522 0.509 0.521
volunteer 0.504 0.498 0.513 0.509 0.481 0.508 0.520 0.506
sport 0.487 0.483 0.494 0.481 0.493 0.474 0.494 0.493
other hobby 0.196 0.192 0.202 0.210 0.186 0.183 0.199 0.205
insurance 0.503 0.508 0.496 0.528 0.506 0.493 0.487 0.506
flexible 0.517 0.523 0.508 0.533 0.511 0.525 0.515 0.501
attendance 0.493 0.500 0.482 0.499 0.489 0.513 0.480 0.485
recent computer 0.152 0.151 0.154 0.168 0.145 0.142 0.139 0.171
relevant computer 0.378 0.377 0.379 0.377 0.381 0.373 0.376 0.383
age 49.439 55.375 40.333 62 55 50 45 35
method of sending:
fax 0.786 0.780 0.795 0.790 0.771 0.780 0.816 0.772
email 0.179 0.186 0.170 0.176 0.191 0.188 0.157 0.185
online 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.037 0.032 0.027 0.041
firm characteristics:
EOE/AA 0.124 0.127 0.119 0.127 0.135 0.120 0.110 0.130
professional 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.045 0.043 0.031 0.042 0.039
education 0.025 0.028 0.020 0.022 0.033 0.027 0.020 0.021
health 0.140 0.146 0.132 0.144 0.147 0.146 0.145 0.118
manager 0.066 0.062 0.070 0.072 0.054 0.062 0.064 0.076
clerical 0.250 0.252 0.247 0.249 0.256 0.250 0.230 0.266
sales 0.245 0.245 0.244 0.241 0.254 0.240 0.240 0.248
craftsman 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.024 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.026
operative 0.044 0.043 0.046 0.045 0.048 0.037 0.049 0.041
service 0.145 0.140 0.154 0.135 0.126 0.159 0.162 0.145
laborer 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.025 0.018 0.017
# obeservations 4229 2560 1669 763 921 876 890 779
Notes:  
hs grad age hs grad age
Older includes:   hs1959 62 Younger includes: hs1976 45
hs1966 55 hs1986 35
hs1971 50  44 
       Appendix Table 1b
Summary Statistics:  Florida 
Variables All older younger 1959 1966 1971 1976 1986
resume characteristics:
hsgrad 1971.538 1965.654 1980.675 1959 1966 1971 1976 1986
yrs of 10 in LF 5.694 5.674 5.726 5.684 5.672 5.667 5.752 5.696
typo 0.259 0.264 0.252 0.206 0.282 0.296 0.288 0.211
college 0.186 0.190 0.179 0.183 0.207 0.180 0.159 0.201
computer 0.511 0.506 0.518 0.506 0.501 0.510 0.522 0.514
volunteer 0.494 0.494 0.493 0.523 0.478 0.484 0.484 0.502
sport 0.499 0.493 0.508 0.495 0.508 0.478 0.513 0.502
other hobby 0.183 0.179 0.188 0.189 0.177 0.173 0.188 0.188
insurance 0.500 0.505 0.493 0.536 0.484 0.496 0.484 0.502
flexible 0.510 0.515 0.502 0.513 0.495 0.536 0.511 0.492
attendance 0.500 0.496 0.505 0.508 0.499 0.483 0.526 0.482
recent computer 0.156 0.152 0.163 0.150 0.151 0.153 0.159 0.168
relevant computer 0.380 0.371 0.393 0.360 0.378 0.373 0.402 0.384
age 49.462 55.346 40.325 62 55 50 45 35
method of sending:
fax 0.837 0.839 0.834 0.831 0.839 0.847 0.830 0.838
email 0.134 0.136 0.129 0.145 0.134 0.132 0.137 0.120
online 0.029 0.024 0.037 0.024 0.028 0.022 0.033 0.042
firm characteristics:
EOE/AA 0.149 0.144 0.158 0.152 0.146 0.135 0.146 0.172
professional 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.010
education 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003
health 0.148 0.150 0.144 0.142 0.165 0.144 0.140 0.149
manager 0.048 0.044 0.053 0.051 0.035 0.047 0.058 0.048
clerical 0.262 0.264 0.260 0.247 0.280 0.263 0.263 0.258
sales 0.195 0.189 0.205 0.204 0.180 0.185 0.187 0.226
craftsman 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.043 0.038 0.046 0.044 0.038
operative 0.081 0.081 0.079 0.078 0.085 0.081 0.097 0.059
service 0.173 0.176 0.169 0.180 0.161 0.185 0.165 0.174
laborer 0.035 0.038 0.030 0.044 0.041 0.031 0.029 0.032
# observations 3773 2295 1478 705 762 828 787 691
Notes:    45 
Appendix Table 2a
Response Percentage by Method of Delivery
Massachusetts Florida
Positive Interview # observations Positive Interview # observations
Fax
Want-Ad 0.09 0.05 2687 0.11 0.06 2508
Call-in 0.06 0.02 636 0.05 0.03 650
All 0.09 0.05 3323 0.10 0.05 3158
Email
Want-Ad 0.08 0.04 614 0.11 0.05 364
Call-in 0.01 0.01 145 0.06 0.04 140
All 0.07 0.03 759 0.10 0.05 504
Online
Want-Ad 0.18 0.11 28 0.13 0.13 16
Call-in 0.08 0.03 115 0.04 0.02 95
All 0.10 0.05 143 0.05 0.04 111
All
Want-Ad 0.09 0.05 3333 0.11 0.06 2888
Call-in 0.05 0.02 896 0.05 0.03 885
All 0.08 0.04 4229 0.10 0.05 3773
Notes:
Appendix Table 2b
Marginal Effect of EOE on Response Rate for Massachusetts
      All Occupations Non-health Occupations
Variables Positive Interview Positive Interview
EOE/AA 0.044 0.027 0.018 0.007
(0.025) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017)
Over 50 -0.015 -0.018 -0.013 -0.016
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
EOE/AA*over 50 -0.009 0.004 -0.024 -0.010
(0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.016)
Notes:   Standard errors in parentheses  